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
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
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
## STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT

STRIVING TO SELL SALT TWO:  
SEVEN YEARS OF SOVIET ARGUMENTS  
CPT Roderick P. Nasbe

1980

GARMISCH, GERMANY

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STRIVING TO SELL SALT TWO:  
SEVEN YEARS OF SOVIET ARGUMENTS

Captain Roderick P. Nasbe

June 1980

*AMENDED*

US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE  
Garmisch, Germany

1423



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FOR E W O R D

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SUMMARY

Based on Soviet sources, this paper reviews Soviet arguments in favor of SALT 2 over the course of seven years of negotiations (1972-1979). The paper analyzes four themes and six objectives found in Soviet writings on SALT 2 in seeking to answer why the Soviets so consistently supported SALT 2. Conclusions are tentative. The themes reflect Soviet notions of continual conflict between opposing ideological camps in the nuclear age. The objectives aimed to constrain U.S. forces while preserving those of the USSR. Through SALT, it can be speculated, the Soviet Union sought to balance -- or overbalance -- its military forces, probably to permit power projection for political purposes.

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Within months after the May 1972 signing of the SALT\* I Agreements, negotiations began on SALT\* 2. During the following seven years, Soviet writers have addressed the utility of future agreements. Since the signing of the SALT 2 accords in June 1979, Soviet articles have argued that the U.S. Senate should ratify the agreements and that SALT 3 discussions should follow. This paper seeks to review what the Soviets have said in favor of SALT 2 over the course of seven years (1972-1979), to identify themes and objectives of the Soviet writings, and to analyze their significance.

It is a fundamental premise of this paper that, during the course of the SALT 2 negotiations, Soviet writers consistently argued in favor of a SALT 2 agreement. Beyond this, it is hypothesized, certain general themes in these arguments have remained constant, while specific objectives have evolved and varied as the environment and the matters of the negotiations changed. For the most part, substantive material in this paper was derived from Soviet sources.

The paper is organized in three sections. First, some general observations on the SALT 2 negotiating period, starting with the SALT I agreements, provide background information. Second, several basic themes and objectives identified in Soviet articles concerning SALT 2 are presented and an attempt is made to analyze the Soviet writings to explain why certain themes persisted and why objectives changed. Finally, conclusions regarding Soviet strategy at SALT and its future consequences are offered.

\* SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks/Treaty

## II. BACKGROUND

### SALT I

With the advent of nuclear weapons in the 1940s came concomitant attempts to control nuclear arms. Over the course of the succeeding twenty years, much rhetoric was heard but little real progress was seen. The Limited Test Ban Treaty (1963) was the first significant agreement in this area - achievable mainly because it was based on national technical means (seismic) for control. No progress was made to constrain nuclear weapons themselves, until SALT I was concluded in 1972. The SALT I agreements were not easily reached, taking over two and a half years to negotiate, with five years of prior discussions before the two sides agreed to the notion of limiting strategic arms.

Why the two sides joined together in SALT negotiations can be explained in numerous ways. For both the U.S. and the USSR, SALT may have been seen as a means of achieving the oft-cited objectives of arms control: reducing the chance of nuclear war occurring, reducing the destruction if it should occur, reducing national defense costs, and strengthening mutual confidence.

While the two sides may have shared certain interest in pursuing SALT, they also had reasons of their own. The United States saw SALT as the key to detente with the Soviet Union. For their part, the Soviets saw in SALT a means of "curtailing Western programs and dispositions that tended to offset the gains the USSR had herself been making in bringing about a more satisfactory military balance, especially as regards nuclear and strategic weapons."<sup>1</sup> There was recognition that the process would have to be mutual and that, therefore, certain complex cost-benefit analyses would be required in order to determine a negotiating strategy.

More specifically, the Soviets had political, economic, technological and military objectives at SALT. The most fundamental, and probably most crucial, Soviet political objective at SALT I, according to one Western analyst, was to obtain American recognition of Soviet parity with the United States ..."parity in the broadest political and political-military as well as strategic sense, spelling an end to the USSR's inferiority in its relations with the United States."<sup>2</sup>

Exactly how much importance Soviet leaders accord the economic factors regarding SALT is, of course, not known. One view of Soviet thinking on this matter holds that the arms race has been a costly drain of resources on both of the superpowers. As weapons technology continues to become more sophisticated, the cost of strategic forces can be projected to impose increasingly greater burdens on the economies of both sides. Although the two sides' economies are large, they also are finite; hence it is necessary to make trade-offs between defense spending and demands from other sectors of the economy. Having long invested greater proportions of their budgets to defense than have Americans, the Soviets have delayed the competing requirement of reapportioning funds into consumer goods. The time may have come, it could be argued, that with the advent of the SALT negotiations in 1969, the Soviets sought to begin preparations for some adjustment of the economy away from defense. While it is doubtful that any significant shifts were contemplated at that time, medium- to long-range progress may have been projected.<sup>3</sup>

On the other hand, the argument can be made that the arms competition, while

costly, has neither drained the economy nor sapped popular spirit, and that, since strategic motives were overriding, cost was not a determinative factor in Soviet interests in SALT I. Soviet economic health, it is argued, has been and will continue to be sufficient to sustain the arms build-up. At the same time, because of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam--expensive and unpopular--Americans would be less and less willing to sustain high-level expenditures for strategic arms than in the past. Therefore, the Soviet Union would likely face a less formidable competitor. While economics is surely not insignificant in Soviet decision-making and should not be discounted as one of many factors affecting arms control decisions, it would appear not to have been the prime determinant of past Soviet strategic policy.<sup>4</sup>

A SALT agreement would also provide the Soviets with a "breathing spell" in the arms competition which could be of benefit in overcoming the technological gap between the USSR and the West. Because of the fact that considerable progress has been made in maintaining technological competence and currency in Soviet defense-related research and development, it is logical to presume that, given a breathing spell in the arms race, Soviet scientists' efforts would be directed somewhat more toward the non-defense (consumer goods) gap. In stabilizing the arms race, SALT was to offer a relaxation of tensions in order to create an opportunity for wider borrowing of Western technology. To what extent Soviet leaders were willing to go in obtaining Western technology is unclear, but the creation of an opportunity to help reduce the technological gap may have been an additional factor in Soviet interest in SALT.<sup>5</sup>

The principal objectives of the Soviet military in SALT have been seen by Western analysts as the following:<sup>6</sup> First the Soviet military sought to assume that, in any SALT agreement, they would obtain no military disadvantage and, if possible, would obtain advantage. There is presumed to be a strong positive correlation between the Soviet achievement of rough strategic parity with the U.S. and the SALT negotiations, perhaps reflective of a long-standing military position that "imperialism can be deflected from aggressive actions only through the build up of countervailing power."<sup>7</sup> It is logical to suppose that the Soviet military would prefer to move beyond mere strategic parity with the U.S. to achieve clear-cut military-technological superiority. This can be seen as beneficial to the military in several ways: military superiority may be translatable into political leverage; military inventories and arms programs would be kept large; and a potent war-fighting capability would be maintained, in case deterrence should fail.<sup>8</sup> Further, while protecting its own strategic programs, the Soviets likely sought to hinder U.S. strategic force developments as much as possible. To do so would foster both the aim of achieving parity and the presumed aim of Soviet superiority.<sup>9</sup>

Second, the Soviet military sought to maintain freedom of action for military research and development programs, except where limitations equally constrain the United States' program. One writer calls this the fundamental Soviet military objective -- "to be able to continue their vigorous development and deployment programs in pursuit of, at a minimum, a position of comprehensive parity in strategic weaponry vis-a-vis the United States."<sup>10</sup>

Third, the Soviet military sought to prevent U.S. deployment of an extensive anti-ballistic missile (ABM) system, even if it meant foregoing a Soviet ABM system. This has been seen by another writer as probably "the most important specific goal for both the military and the political leaders of the USSR."<sup>11</sup> Not only was the Soviet ABM system incapable of coping with MIRVed U.S. warheads, (that is, weapons with multiple independently retargetable reentry

vehicles) but the Soviets presumed that the American Safeguard (ABM) system was likely to be an effective defensive shield against their missiles.<sup>12</sup>

Fourth, the Soviet military sought to maintain the right to have strategic forces to use against third-country forces (particularly, against China).

Secondary objectives of the Soviet military at SALT have been seen as the following:<sup>13</sup>

- (1) to avoid on-site inspection in the USSR, and instead to base SALT verification on use of national technical means;
- (2) to constrain all U.S. weapons systems capable of striking the Soviet Union; and
- (3) to keep SALT negotiations from compromising Soviet secrets to the U.S., to third countries, and to the Soviet public.

SALT I, signed in May 1972, contained two separate agreements: an ABM Treaty and an Interim Offensive Arms Agreement. The most pressing issues were constraints placed on ABMs and on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICMs).

The ABM Treaty essentially limited each side to deployment of no more than two ABM sites, located no closer than 1,300 kilometers apart, and having no more than 100 ABM launchers at each site. The limits were designed to prevent an effective national defense system from being constructed, thus keeping each side vulnerable to attack and hostage to deterrence. While the Soviets had been interested in a strong ABM network in the early and mid-1960s, during the SALT negotiations they seemed to acquiesce to the need for ABM limitations. A plausible explanation for the Soviet shift is that technological development of Soviet ABM systems had been a less than spectacular success. Soviet inability to provide a shield for the USSR probably gave impetus toward Soviet attempts to restrain similar American systems. It is not clear that the Soviets would have been willing to ban ABM systems completely. It was apparent that they preferred to keep some ABM sites, particularly around Moscow-- as a hedge against small-scale strikes by any third country, against accidental launchings, and to gain some operational experience with ABMs.<sup>14</sup>

The SALT I Interim Offensive Arms Agreement established limits on ICBM launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, with somewhat higher limits set for the Soviet Union than for the United States. The imbalance in favor of the USSR can be seen as the realization of one of the Soviet military's objectives at SALT. Soviet military and political leaders were determined that the Soviet Union should equal the United States in ICBMs, at the least, and in ICBMs and SLBMs combined, if possible. The speed up of construction schedules for ICBMs and SLBMs before the start of SALT I negotiations permitted the Soviets to send "signals" to the United States during the negotiating period. Slowdowns and halts in construction of strategic weapons were apparently intended to signal Soviet intentions and seriousness in halting the arms build-up.

In addition to limiting strategic offensive systems at levels not unfavorable to the Soviet Union, the Soviet military also insisted on defining "strategic" systems - the ones that the strategic arms limitation talks were designed to constrain - in such a way as to include all U.S. weapons capable of striking Soviet territory. Essentially, at issue was the group of weapons included under the heading "Forward-Based Systems" (FBS), that is, mostly bombers and medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs and IRBMs) stationed at U.S.

bases in allied territory, particularly in Europe, and on U.S. aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean. On this issue, the United States would not relent, and SALT was thus confined to "central strategic systems"--the number of weapons which posed the gravest threat to both sides: ABM, ICBMs, and SLBM's.

On the American side, there was strong fear of large Soviet ICBMs and hence strong interest in limiting these weapons. Limits on these large ICBMs were set in SALT 1, but the Soviet military lost little in the process. Provisions were included in the agreement which permitted modernization of ICBM silos, so long as no "significant increase"--defined in the agreement as meaning 10-15% -- was made in silo size. This permitted the Soviets to deploy a new generation of larger ICBMs, which were under development at the very time the SALT negotiations were underway. In general, it seems that SALT 1 had little impact on Soviet--or U.S.--programs which were either operational or in development at that time.

Following the conclusion of the SALT 1 package, the U.S. Senate debated the merits of the accords. The Soviet leadership, on the other hand, with no domestic debate on the issue to contend with, clearly lauded the results. They noted that it had been possible to reach an agreement at SALT because, in the first place, Soviet power was equal to that of the U.S. and, secondly, American leaders realized the changing balance and were responding realistically to the situation.<sup>15</sup> The Soviets claimed that the agreements were equal and that they considered both sides' security equally. There was concern, on the Soviets' part, that any U.S. push to gain military-technological superiority could damage the agreements. The agreements were seen by both sides as an important step toward meaningful arms control, and were characterized by the Soviets as a first step toward disarmament.

## SALT 2

### Seven Years of Negotiations

Within several months following the signing of the SALT 1 agreements, the two sides began talks to work out SALT 2 accords. The negotiations began in November 1972 and continued on a long, dragged-out course until the signing in June 1979 of the final package comprising SALT 2. Initial hopes were that SALT 2 could be concluded swiftly. Such expectations were probably unreasonable, especially since SALT 2 was to concern more difficult issues--some having been shelved at SALT 1--including the shape of the future strategic relationship between the two sides.<sup>16</sup> Additionally, various changes in international and domestic politics affected the negotiations.

### Basic Principles of Negotiation

At the Washington summit meeting of June 1973, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed an agreement designed to shape SALT 2. This set of basic negotiating principles itself made reference to the SALT 1 agreements, and the Basic Principles of Relations<sup>17</sup> between the two sides, signed in May 1972. An objective was set to complete and sign SALT 2 in 1974.

Guided by considerations for the two sides' equal security interests, SALT 2 was to have quantitative and qualitative limits, be verified by national technical means, and control future modernization of strategic arms.

#### The Vladivostok Accord

In the first two years of SALT 2 discussions, several issues were raised: replacement of the Interim Agreement by a permanent treaty, limitation of MIRV, and possible inclusion of FBS. Resolution of such issues was complicated by the existence of basic conceptual differences regarding the so-called "strategic cultures" of the two sides, i.e. approaches to strategic power, and the strategic relationship to be forged at SALT.<sup>18</sup>

At the Vladivostok summit, President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev agreed on a framework within which to work out comprehensive SALT 2 accords. Key points of the Vladivostok agreement were equal overall ceilings of all strategic delivery vehicles, including bombers, equal MIRV limits, and ten year duration--through 1985.

American reaction to the Vladivostok accord was mixed. On the one hand, it was felt that some agreement seemed possible at SALT; that any agreement was better than none; and that detente was aided by the Vladivostok meeting. On the other hand, the established guidelines were criticized for setting limits too high, for failing to constrain qualitative improvements, and for failure to level the Soviet throwweight advantage achieved by virtue of sole possession of heavy ICBMs.<sup>19</sup>

The Soviets were unanimously supportive of the Vladivostok guidelines. They spoke of these accords as creating the form of a SALT 2 agreement based on the principles of equality and equal security, peaceful coexistence, and detente.

Post-Vladivostok negotiations became snagged on various issues: "counting-rules" for verifying MIRV limits could not be agreed upon; the separate issues of U.S. concern regarding the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber and of Soviet concern regarding U.S. cruise missile development became interlinked.

Internationally, events did not support closer American cooperation with the Soviets. The Soviet Union was unsupportive in preventing the Middle East conflict in 1973; it exacerbated the 1974 oil crisis for the West; and it supported the 1975 incursion into Angola with proxy troops. In these and other instances, the Soviet Union showed little restraint in provoking the U.S. and little effort to ameliorate opposition to SALT by various American elements. During this same period, an American presidential campaign was disrupting business as usual. A natural pause in the SALT negotiations occurred, halting the process until the U.S. had settled on a president and he on his SALT negotiators and negotiating approach.

#### The March 1977 Proposals

Within a matter of weeks after his inauguration, President Carter spoke of reaching quick agreement with the Soviets on SALT 2 following the Vladivostok guidelines.<sup>20</sup> Brezhnev too, was speaking in terms of completing SALT 2 by finishing the work done at Vladivostok.<sup>21</sup> The U.S. administration set the stage for Secretary of State Vance to visit Moscow in late March by irritating

the Russians with a vocal, open campaign for human rights, focused on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Further, on the eve of Vance's departure, the President outlined at a news conference a "comprehensive proposal" for substantial reductions at SALT, as well as a "fallback proposal" based on the Vladivostok accord.<sup>22</sup> The Soviets viewed these proposals as a deliberate American propaganda move, inasmuch as they were "aimed at obtaining unilateral advantages for the U.S.A., to the detriment of the Soviet Union."<sup>23</sup> The Soviet leaders completely rebuffed Vance, rejecting the U.S. proposals.

By May 1977, the two sides met several times exchanging views on how to proceed with the negotiations and finally decided on a new, "three-tier framework" for SALT 2. First, a Treaty to run through 1985, based on the Vladivostok accord, would set aggregate and sub-ceilings. Second, a three-year Protocol would temporarily constrain cruise missiles, mobile ICBMs, and certain qualitative improvements. And, third, a joint Statement of Principles would set guidelines for SALT 3 negotiations.

Each side stated that it intended to take no actions inconsistent with the provisions of the SALT 1 Interim Agreement even after it expired in October 1977, while SALT 2 negotiations were underway. During the course of the next 21 months (from September 1977 until June 1979) the details of the final SALT 2 agreements were completed.

### Ratification

#### U.S. Senate Ratification Process

On 18 June 1979, the day of the signing in Vienna, President Carter reported to a joint session of Congress in Washington on SALT 2. He submitted the SALT 2 agreements to the U.S. Senate on 22 June 1979 for its advice and consent to ratification. In subsequent months, committees and sub-committees of the Senate heard testimony on various aspects of SALT 2, but a full floor vote was not anticipated before the early months of 1980.

#### Arguments Pro and Con

During the SALT 2 negotiating process, and since the signing, there has taken place in the United States a considerable debate over the merits and shortcomings of the agreements. Proponents point to the following arguments:

- (1) SALT 2 is better than no agreement at all;
- (2) SALT 2 imposes equal aggregate ceilings, holding the Soviet Union below weapons levels otherwise anticipated;
- (3) constraints on MIRV and on new missile developments ease the U.S. problem of land-based missile vulnerability;
- (4) the Soviets are required to cut their forces under SALT 2;
- (5) the U.S. can add weapons;
- (6) the U.S. ALCM (air-launched cruise missile) program remains intact;
- (7) the ban on GLCM (ground-launched cruise missiles) and SLCM (sea-launched missiles) is only temporary.

- (8) the agreement is adequately verifiable;
- (9) SALT is important per se, and should not be linked to Soviet foreign policy actions; and
- (10) SALT 2 is merely a step in a long arms control process-- future agreements can correct any SALT 2 deficiencies.<sup>24</sup>

Critics cite the following arguments:

- (1) SALT 2 sets asymmetrical, unequal limits;
- (2) the MIRV sublimits are too high;
- (3) the cuts which the Soviets must make are meaningless;
- (4) the temporary constraints of the Protocol set a precedent which we may not want to follow at SALT 3;
- (5) the Protocol terms stifle U.S. technological initiative;
- (6) the non circumvention provisions regarding cruise missile development constrain U.S. allies in NATO;
- (7) certain Soviet systems (SS-20 and BACKFIRE) are not constrained; and
- (8) verification might not be adequate.<sup>25</sup>

### III. ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ARGUMENTS

Throughout the period of the SALT 2 negotiations, the Soviets have consistently espoused several major themes in their arguments for the SALT agreements. At the same time, they have also argued to support various objectives at SALT, more tactical in nature, emerging or declining with conditions and opportunities. This section of the paper will review and analyze what the Soviets have said on these topics.

#### Themes

At least four general themes can be detected in Soviet articles on SALT 2. They have consistently been repeated, in one form or another, in virtually every piece written by the Soviets on this topic. The themes justify the pursuit of arms control as a meaningful component of disarmament efforts; they note the importance of SALT in the context of the overall Soviet-American relationship of peaceful coexistence and in the spirit of detente; they remind that SALT is part of a long arms control process, with many steps or stages; and they accentuate the Soviet demand that any agreement must consider equally the security of both sides, so that neither side gains an advantage. These themes are so general and so consistent that, in reading them one could as well be thinking of SALT 1 or SALT 3 as of SALT 2.

#### End of Arms Race to Bring World Peace

One of the most fundamental Soviet themes concerns the end of the Soviet-American arms race. A Soviet commentator wrote in 1973 that "the Soviet Union regards disarmament problems as one of the most urgent problems of modern times."<sup>26</sup> The ultimate Soviet goal in this field has been said to be "universal and total disarmament."<sup>27</sup>

Stemming from this interest, and considered a "highly important aspect of the [Soviet Union's] overall struggle for disarmament ...", have been the SALT talks.<sup>28</sup> The SALT I agreements were said to lessen the threat of nuclear war and to help curb the arms race.<sup>29</sup> Speaking of the SALT I documents, Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev was quoted as saying that "they greatly reduce the danger of a nuclear war erupting."<sup>30</sup> The SALT-related summit meetings held by Soviet and American leaders in May 1972 and June 1972 were themselves said to have contributed to a relaxation of tension in the world.<sup>31</sup>

Regarding SALT 2, it was claimed that measures taken in that forum "would undoubtedly be a big contribution to lessening the danger of nuclear war and to the strengthening of international peace."<sup>32</sup>

In 1978, Soviet President Brezhnev spoke of the urgency for world civilization of ending the arms race:

International relations are now at a crossroads, as it were, which could lead either to a growth of trust and cooperation, or to a growth of mutual fears, suspicion and arms stockpiles, a crossroads leading, ultimately, either to lasting peace or, at best, to balancing on the brink of war. Detente offers the opportunity of choosing the road to peace. To miss this opportunity would be a crime. The most important, the most pressing task now is to halt the arms race, which has engulfed the world.<sup>33</sup>

This refrain was reiterated by the Warsaw Pact in a declaration in late 1978: "There can be no stable peace while the potential for extermination of the arsenals of [each others'] states is growing so rapidly, a potential already quite adequate, if employed, to put human life on Earth in jeopardy."<sup>34</sup> And again, the point was made in an article written for the American press by a Soviet expert on the U.S.A. shortly after the summer 1979 signing of SALT 2. He said that SALT 2 is a step toward "preventing the horrors of a nuclear holocaust and securing a peaceful future for the next generations" and that it is the only real path open in this direction.<sup>35</sup>

### Peaceful Coexistence<sup>36</sup> and Detente<sup>37</sup>

The SALT documents and the SALT process have been seen by the Soviets as elements in the overall Soviet-American relationship. SALT has been made possible, it is said, only as a result of the "realistic" assessments of trends in the bilateral relations, as well as in the world as a whole. In this context, the agreements are said to contribute "to the work of restructuring relations between states with differing social systems on the principles of peaceful coexistence."<sup>38</sup>

Brezhnev viewed the Soviet Union and the United States as needing to supplement political detente with military detente to cease the arms race, and to take practical steps to reduce arms.<sup>39</sup> In this regard, SALT I was seen as an important factor in facilitating detente and improving the international political climate.<sup>40</sup>

The SALT I agreements and the Basic Principles of Negotiation (June 1973) have been cited as examples of American agreement that "in the nuclear age there was no basis for the maintenance of relations between the two countries other than peaceful coexistence." Further, the SALT process was said to have given

this "fundamental principle" of East-West relations a "definite context" and the SALT agreements were said to have evidenced the solid consolidation of peaceful coexistence.<sup>41</sup>

The Basic Principles and the agreement to prevent nuclear war are cited as important contributions to the "political program" regarding reduction and elimination of the threat of nuclear war. They are said to assert the principles of peaceful coexistence, reflecting the idea that "political detente must be genuinely supplemented by military detente."<sup>42</sup>

The summit meetings of 1972, 1973, and 1974 were claimed to have produced useful documents regarding Soviet-American relations as a result of the development of bilateral ties "on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems."<sup>43</sup> This condition of peaceful coexistence is considered to have been inevitable. Primary responsibility for the achievement of such bilateral relations rests, according to the Soviets, on "basic changes in the balance of strength between socialism and capitalism in the world arena."<sup>44</sup> The working relationship of the superpowers at SALT 2 was also credited with providing better prospects for further "Soviet-American cooperation in tackling other disarmament issues and non-military global problems facing humanity."<sup>45</sup>

#### SALT as a Step in the Arms Control Process

One of the most consistent claims for SALT has been that it is a "continuing and lasting process" of arms control.<sup>46</sup> As a political matter, the significance of SALT is as a "step" in the "process" of arms control.<sup>47</sup>

SALT I was the first agreement of its kind. It was important, but it was only a first step.<sup>48</sup> It was part of a stage-by-stage approach.<sup>49</sup> The SALT I Interim Agreement was not comprehensive; follow-on negotiations were necessary.<sup>50</sup> SALT I, thus, provided a sound point of departure for SALT 2.<sup>51</sup>

The SALT 2 talks were viewed as continuing the process.<sup>52</sup> The general aim of SALT was considered to be the achievement of more complete quantitative and qualitative limitations of strategic offensive arms; their subsequent reduction; the saving of material resources; and the providing of a good base for SALT 3 talks.<sup>53</sup> SALT 2 was claimed to continue a process to which Americans were already accustomed and upon which they relied.<sup>54</sup> SALT 2 was thus important in creating favorable pre-conditions for further talks and progress.<sup>55</sup>

The Soviets see SALT 2 not as an end, but as a step in the process of restraining nuclear arms. In SALT 2, agreement was reached for talks on further arms control measures. After SALT 2, it was said, there will be a next stage of talks aimed at further limits.<sup>56</sup>

#### Equality and Equal Security; No Superiority; No Unilateral Advantages

The most often cited theme in Soviet writings regarding SALT is that any SALT agreement must be based on equal and identical security. Closely linked, and almost always accompanying that phrase, is the notion that, within that framework, there can be no allowance for American attempts to gain superiority

or unilateral advantages.

Virtually every article written on SALT includes some variants of these themes. Even as SALT I was in its final stages of negotiation, the comment was made that, at SALT, "an atmosphere of mutual interest, the observance of the principles of equal security and the inadmissibility of unilateral military advantages is important."<sup>57</sup> At that time, Brezhnev directly addressed the point "the decisive factor for the success of these talks is strict observance of the principles of equal security for both sides, [and] renunciation of attempts to secure any unilateral advantages at the expense of the other side."<sup>58</sup>

In Soviet articles written during the SALT 2 negotiations, the principles of equal security and no unilateral advantage are always emphasized as the necessary basis for agreement.<sup>59</sup>

#### Analysis of Themes

The themes identified here are general in nature and are found throughout Soviet writings on SALT. On the one hand, they can be seen both as desiderata and as rationale for strategic arms control efforts. On the other hand, they seem to represent in open form a portion of Soviet thought regarding the nature of peace and war in the nuclear age.

Western analysts have debated over past decades about the nature of the Soviet Union, its basic goals, strategies, and tactics. While the Western discussions considered the Soviets either as aggressive, expansionist, and dangerous, or alternatively as defensive, status-quo seeking, and of little threat, the Soviets have touted a standard line.

At the very base of the Soviet philosophy is the Clausewitzian-Leninist dictum that "War is simply the continuation of politics by other means."<sup>60</sup> Although it may not be clear to all Western analysts that this rule holds for nuclear war as well as conventional war, and while the ultimate goal of the Soviets in a hypothetical future war is speculative, Soviet portrayals of the inevitable victory of world communism and of an all-encompassing conflict between communism and capitalism give evidence of their thinking.<sup>61</sup>

The Soviets present themselves at the vanguard of the inevitable victory (of the USSR as representative of world communism over the U.S. as representative of capitalism) since the Soviet Union alone, it claims, possesses the true interpretation of (Marxian) history. Thus the Kremlin, with "historical correctness" on its side, judges the righteousness of its own actions and the evil of capitalist actions. Judged in such a manner, any war waged by a capitalist state--even in its own defense--is labeled an "unjust war", since the capitalist body is necessarily pursuing an imperialistic foreign policy. By the same standards, even overt aggression by a socialist state--or by a so-called "national liberation movement" struggling for emancipation of the socialist proletariat--is sanctified as a "just war".

In the constant communist-capitalist struggle, the forces of each side are continually evaluated by the Soviets in military, political, economic, and ideological terms in order to exploit weaknesses and to shift the "correlation of forces" in its favor. In this regard, the Soviet Union has been building its military forces and its international and domestic might, while at the same time perceiving the decline of the "contradiction-riddled" capitalist world.

These forces, combined with the decreasing effectiveness of military power as an instrument of national power (in the nuclear armed world), impelled the imperialist nations to yield their cold war positions in favor of acceptance of a relationship of "peaceful coexistence" with the communist states.

Soviet statements on SALT must be viewed in this context. The assertion that an end to the arms race can bring world peace should appear to be an honorable goal put forth by a nation which has suffered deep losses in war and which likely has a genuine interest in peace. Since 1945, both the Soviet Union and the United States have been engaged in a continuing process of seeking to reduce the danger in the world caused by the existence of large nuclear weapons arsenals. The two sides have had basically compatible ends in mind (peace, possible arms control, perhaps an eventual disarmament), but have differed from the start on means (the Soviet Union demanded disarmament before control mechanisms would be created; the United States insisted on control before disarmament). So, at a basic level, Soviet arguments, that attempts to end the arms race will contribute significantly toward world peace, are shared equally by the United States. However, in the specific approaches to disarmament the two sides have adopted polar positions. In the more restricted realm of arms control, similar divergent positions of the two sides (for example, regarding the use of various means of verification: on-site inspection, "black boxes", exchanges of data, "open skies", overhead reconnaissance, seismology, and other means) precluded any significant arms control progress for almost twenty years into the nuclear age.

The relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States, which has taken many ups and downs since 1917, is one of major concern to both sides' leaders. Armed conflict has been avoided by both sides, ever more since the advent of nuclear weapons. The Cold War was costly, tense, and filled with potential danger. A cooperative relationship, bringing mutual benefits, is thus desirable to both superpowers, especially in comparison to possible alternatives. Just as with the approaches to disarmament and arms control, so with the terms of cooperation and with the definitions of concepts such as "peaceful coexistence" and "detente", differences arise between the U.S. and Soviet perceptions. While the West views peaceful coexistence and detente as conditions of stability in the superpower relations, the Soviet Union sees such conditions to build strength for future confrontation.

There is little reason for Westerners to feel secure in a period of "detente" with the Soviet Union, "coexisting peacefully" with the U.S. Despite the elaboration of such themes, the Soviet Union continues to prioritize the heavy industry and defense sectors of its economy; it continues to amass an impressively powerful military force, capable of long-range power projection; it has sought strategic inroads in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia; it crudely invaded Afghanistan and threatens other states in the region.

In view of the Soviet record, the West should doubt Soviet sincerity in seeking the kind of relationship under the guise of detente which would benefit both sides. Soviet actions have demonstrated quite clearly that Western perceptions of detente failed to heed the definitional base provided by the Soviets themselves. Peaceful coexistence is not without continuous ideological struggle. Detente is not intended by the Soviets for mutual benefit, but to undermine the West and to bolster the USSR.

The Soviet concept of SALT as a step in the arms control process parallels the concept of detente as a dynamic and continuous process, proceeding from stage to stage. Just as detente has both advocates and critics in the West, so is the "process" of arms control viewed favorably by some and skeptically by others.

At one extreme are those who favor detente and see benefit in the arms control process. If Soviet interest in a stable relationship, involving close co-operation, with the U.S. is assumed, then the process of talking and of negotiating arms limitations can be considered useful in itself. The process of SALT provides a forum for exchange of views, for mutual education and understanding. Whether agreements are reached or not, it is the process of cooperating that matters,

At the other extreme is the view that if SALT is thought of as a process of negotiations, during which time the Soviet Union builds up its forces and attempts to achieve some sort of de facto superiority, then what counts are the actual products of the negotiations -- the arms control agreements. If much talk produces little significant arms constraints, then the value gained by merely "talking" must be considered degraded by the absence of meaningful results. If during the period of negotiations, one side increases its force posture to the extent that any constraints agreed to will be of little or no consequence, then perhaps that action shows bad faith and bad purpose in the effort.

Between the two extremes, there are certainly various other views regarding the process of arms control. One such view, for example, might hold that while both sides are anxious for meaningful arms control, neither will yield partial advantages, and during the period of talks both sides will bolster their forces to preclude losing ground as the process occurs. Even here, the process can have value. The meeting, discussing, exchanging of views, tough negotiating, compromising, relenting or standing firm -- all of this creates a greater sense of each side understanding the other. Also, any agreements have been seen (by some) as more meaningful than none at all. SALT I for instance, provides a base -- a point of reference -- for future SALT discussions.

Therefore, whereas the Soviets see SALT as a step in the arms control process, so too the West may view the process as useful. In final analysis, the SALT process is probably a neutral value per se; it is neither inherently good or bad. The judgement of its utility seems to depend on whose ox is being gored.

During the Senate debate on SALT I, a strong feeling arose that it was the American ox which had been gored. This reaction arose in response to the asymmetrical levels of weapons (more correctly, higher levels of Soviet than U.S. ICBM and SLBM launchers) permitted each side in SALT I. As a result, the Senate mandated U.S. negotiators to conclude future SALT agreements based on limiting the U.S. to strategic force levels not inferior to limits on similar Soviet forces. Thus, the U.S. became bound to a policy of "equivalence".

For their part, the Soviets have preached equality as a necessary condition for agreement. At the same time, they have demanded special considerations to ensure for the Soviet Union security equal to that of the United States. To be sure, the two sides are strikingly different and comparisons are difficult. There are numerous asymmetries: in geo-strategic position; in numbers, location, and qualities of friendly and allied states; in actual and perceived threats from unfriendly states (some neighbors); in the numbers and types of forces deployed and projected. Not only do such asymmetries confound comparison, but they also impose differing demands on each side for providing adequate security for itself. In this regard, the Soviets express various security concerns: being ringed by threatening forces (such as NATO and China); facing unfriendly alliances (NATO, CENTO, and SEATO were all in some state of existence during the period of SALT 2 negotiations); and being threatened by "strategic forces" (such as the American FBS and other NATO forces) which the

Soviet Union contends should be constrained at SALT. That both sides should cite equality as a goal is understandable. Neither desires to yield or concede superiority to the other, or to accept inferiority itself. However, in reality, equality may be an elusive concept.

If equality was to any extent possible at SALT 2, it may have been due to the "magic" of diplomacy -- by selecting broad categories, and by cleverly defining weapons into categories, the negotiators to some extent avoided strict and rigid balancing. Still, such weapons as cruise missiles, almost-heavy bombers (BACKFIRE), modern large ballistic missiles (SS-18), have no direct analog on the other side, so were certain to become sticking points in the SALT negotiations. Thus, trade-offs were necessary. If the exchanges were equitable, each side would gain certain unilateral advantages which would be offset by those of the other side. The Soviets merely sought to ensure that any U.S. advantages were minimal and that any Soviet advantages were not compromised.

### Objectives

#### Constrain U.S. FBS

The FBS issue -- the Soviet argument that U.S. forward-based systems capable of delivering nuclear weapons to the territory of the Soviet Union versus the American contention that these systems were not "strategic but theater weapons and thus not liable for inclusion at SALT -- was put aside at SALT 1. This and other matters were expected to be taken up at SALT 2. When SALT 2 talks began, the Soviet negotiators returned to their prior contention that FBS should be taken into account at SALT. At the same time, they denied the negotiability of their own systems capable of striking targets in Western Europe.

Prior to the Vladivostok summit, the FBS issue was mentioned little in the Soviet press. An indication that the issue might have been raised when President Nixon visited Moscow in 1974 was a comment by Brezhnev that the Soviet Union still favored "the withdrawal from the Mediterranean of all Soviet and U.S. ships carrying nuclear weapons."<sup>62</sup> Soviet demands regarding FBS have been hypothesized to have been motivated by the desire to fragment West European unity, to limit by negotiation potential damage to the USSR, or to use the issue as a bargaining device to negotiate concessions from the U.S.<sup>63</sup>

At Vladivostok, the Soviets apparently dropped their demands to constrain FBS in the forum of SALT. Exactly why they abandoned this claim is not clear, but then -National Security Affairs Advisor Kissinger hinted that the Soviets may have concluded that FBS were not "suitable for a significant attack on the Soviet Union."<sup>64</sup> There is some suspicion that the Soviets relented on the FBS issue at Vladivostok in exchange for no constraints on throw-weight, in which they had a strong predominance.<sup>65</sup>

Following the Vladivostok summit, SALT 2 negotiations resumed but, during the course of the following year, little progress was made. FBS was reported in the Western press as one of the obstacles to agreement. Reports of the talks indicate that, at this difficult time, the Soviets reintroduced treaty language calling for the West to compensate the Soviet Union for U.S. FBS and for third country forces.<sup>66</sup> The negotiations then passed through a period of decline until President Carter took office and resumed the talks. As noted earlier, his March 1977 proposals shocked the Soviets, who responded by bringing

up numerous old issues, including FBS. Foreign Minister Gromyko stated that "in the light of the latest U.S. proposals ... we are entitled to raise the question of elimination of American forward-based nuclear means."<sup>67</sup>

SALT 2 was eventually completed without inclusion of FBS constraints. Nevertheless, FBS is likely to enter into any future arms limitation talks. The Statement of Principles for subsequent negotiations leaves open the opportunity for the sides to raise any issue relative to further limitation of strategic arms and to consider other steps to ensure the equality and equal security of both sides.

#### Avoid Constraints on BACKFIRE Bomber

American analysts have argued alternately that the Soviets' bomber (TU-22M), codenamed BACKFIRE by NATO, has capabilities equivalent of a long-range bomber and that it could be considered a medium-range bomber. The Soviets, in their statements, have refused to accept that BACKFIRE might be a long-range (strategic) bomber, hence, liable to be constrained at SALT. The Soviets contend that U.S. objection to BACKFIRE is an obstructionist tactic. BACKFIRE, they claim, is a medium-range bomber. If the argument that in-flight refuelling capability increases its range to the extent that it could be considered a strategic bomber, then that same argument would apply to virtually any combat aircraft with that capability -- including all carrier-borne aircraft and forward-based aircraft of the U.S.<sup>68</sup>

The question of whether or not to include BACKFIRE in SALT 2 was, along with the issue of cruise missiles, considered by the Soviets a principle issue causing delay in reaching a SALT accord.<sup>69</sup> To resolve the deadlock, the Soviet Union provided assurances (as requested by the U.S.) in a letter from President Brezhnev to President Carter at the Vienna Summit that the BACKFIRE bomber would not be given capabilities to strike targets on the territory of the United States and that the production rate would not be increased above then-current levels (30 per year).<sup>70</sup>

#### Constrain U.S. Cruise Missiles

One important Soviet objective has been to maximize constraints on American deployments of cruise missiles, including such deployments on allied territory.<sup>71</sup> The Soviets claim that the deployment of American long-range sea- and land-based cruise missiles would "emasculate" the SALT 2 agreements. Further, it was feared that, without "non-transfer" provisions, there would remain loopholes in the agreement by which the U.S. could transfer cruise missile technology to other countries, thereby undermining the accords.<sup>72</sup>

#### Retain Land-based Heavy ICBMs; Limit All Types of Strategic Weapons, Not Just ICBMs

Differing conceptions of strategic forces deployments of the U.S. and the USSR gave rise to asymmetrical distributions of the two sides' forces among the various elements of the so-called TRIAD.<sup>73</sup> The Soviets have placed considerably greater emphasis than did the U.S. on acquiring a force strongly weighted on the side of land-based heavy missiles. The existence of a large number (308) of heavy ICBMs armed with warheads of considerable accuracy, when

compared to the absence of American missiles of that size, created on the American side the perception of a threat the U.S. sought to redress. America's silo-based missile force was becoming increasingly vulnerable as the heavy Soviet missiles became more accurate. As a result, the U.S. tried to eliminate or reduce the offending Soviet weapons.

For their part, the Soviets naturally sought to protect the area in which they had a distinct advantage. As a result, they insisted that any quantitative or qualitative constraints at SALT 2 applied to the aggregate of all systems, with freedom to mix within the aggregate. They also desired that any provisions constraining either new ICBMs or modernization should apply to all of the elements of the TRIAD, as well.<sup>74</sup>

#### Curb New U.S. Weapons, including MX

In November 1973, one Soviet writer put forth a case for permitting modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms under a SALT 2 treaty.<sup>74</sup> These actions were specifically subordinated to the main task of SALT -- limiting arms, but were consistent with provisions of SALT I regarding upgrading of ABM systems.<sup>76</sup> At the same time, the Pentagon and "reactionary circles in the U.S." were criticized for planning the development of weapons as "bargaining chips" (notably the Trident submarine and the B-1 bomber), and for hoping to spur the technological race in order "to gain military strategic advantages over the Soviet Union and also to bring pressure to bear on it during the negotiations." In this regard, the U.S. analyst John Newhouse was quoted by the Soviets as saying that "the honors in an open race for strategic advantage should go to the fastest horse on technology's track-- the United States."<sup>77</sup> The Soviet response to such a challenge was that the cost of a technological race would be staggering; the new weapons envisioned do not seem necessary (Trident and B-1, notably); weapons created as "bargaining trumps" merely develop into obstacles in negotiations (MIRV, for example], and SALT I demands a new effort to control the qualitative arms race.<sup>78</sup>

In a Soviet article appearing in September 1976, a change of tack can be noted. Here, the thought was expressed that not only should SALT 2 include quantitative constraints, but that also "the question of renouncing the development of new and even more destructive types of these [strategic] weapons" should be negotiated. Weapons cited as examples included the Trident submarine and B-1 bomber, as well as "similar systems in the USSR."<sup>79</sup> By 1978, the Soviets were claiming to have proposed a ban on new weapons (in particular, MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs), which the U.S. side rejected in favor of its own proposal to ban all types of new ICBMs (MIRVed and unMIRVed). Asymmetries in Soviet forces were cited as being exploited by the American offer, which was claimed to be "aimed at gaining unilateral advantages at the expense of the Soviet Union."<sup>80</sup>

Months after SALT 2 was signed, one Soviet article took the West to task for the continuing development of new weapons, a situation said to threaten peace. "Special bodies", including civilian contractors, such as the Institute for Defense Analysis and the Rand Corporation, in the developed capitalist countries are "working to develop new weapons."<sup>81</sup> Military-industrial complexes of the West are engaged in "technological warfare", creating mass destruction weapons and using the latest scientific-technological advances to speed up the arms race. This effort is being made to maintain U.S. and Western technological superiority. At the same time, the USSR has been striving

and continues to work toward control of new types of weapons. SALT I and SALT 2 are cited as examples of bilateral agreements in this area. The unfinished work, one should infer, remains for SALT 3 and for other fora to conclude.<sup>82</sup>

Permit Verification by NTMs Only;  
No Intrusive Measures

In 1963 the U.S. and USSR signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, an agreement to prohibit nuclear explosions of certain types. This treaty was particularly significant from a verification standpoint because it was the first arms control agreement to rely on national technical means (NTMs) -- in this case, seismology -- for verification.

The development of overhead reconnaissance systems (satellites) was instrumental in permitting conclusion of a SALT I agreement. Since its provisions were quantitative in nature, SALT I was generally conceded as verifiable by national technical means. Despite claims of Soviet violations of SALT I, the President, Secretary of Defense, and Secretary of State all have refuted these "fantasies", as the Soviet press calls them, because of the adequacy of American verification means and the workings of the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC).<sup>83</sup>

SALT 2, the Soviets contend, is also verifiable by NTMs.<sup>84</sup> It would have to be, because the Soviets will allow no intrusive measures (such as on-site inspections or the implanting of "black boxes" on their soil). The Soviet Union strictly observes its treaty commitments, so they say, and it commits no violations.<sup>85</sup> But SALT 2 is a more complex set of agreements, involving qualitative constraints not easily verifiable even using intrusive measures. Verifiability of SALT 2 has been legitimately questioned by many in the U.S. When the issue of adding other types of verification measures was introduced by the U.S. the Soviets firmly refused to discuss the matter, and NTMs were settled upon as the means for satisfying compliance with SALT 2.

Nevertheless, certain verification procedures had to be modified. For example, Pravda noted that "counting-rules" for MIRVed missiles were worked out. Further, the SCC has proven itself as a useful forum for resolving disagreements regarding SALT, and will continue to be available for SALT 2.<sup>86</sup>

The Soviet Union holds, further, that attacks on SALT 2 verification are being made for sinister reasons. Criticisms that the USSR cannot be trusted, that Soviet intentions under SALT 2 should be doubted, and that SALT 2 is not verifiable are made by those in the U.S. who urge greater defense expenditures and renewed competition with the Soviet Union in an all-out arms race.<sup>87</sup>

Analysis of Objectives

The above-cited Soviet objectives at SALT 2 are not offered as a comprehensive menu, or even a listing of the objectives the Soviets considered most important. The entire spectrum and rank ordering of Soviet goals may be known only by the Soviet SALT elite. What is available for analysis, on the other hand, is what the Soviets chose to publish.

There is little doubt that the objectives discussed here were significant issues in the negotiations. While Soviet themes regarding SALT 2 persisted,

negotiating objectives seemed to shift with changes in the environment. Initially the Soviets sought to constrain MIRVs (an area of American technological superiority), as well as FBS. Later, FBS demands were dropped, so long as Soviet ICBMs were unhampered. As the U.S. developed cruise missile (CM) technology (CMs were initially considered by Henry Kissinger to be a bargaining chip), the Soviets sought to limit CMs. As qualitative improvements were developing (to skirt quantitative limitations on strategic weapons), the Soviets refused to permit more intrusive verification methods to supplement "national technical means." As Soviet missile improvements made American ICBMs more vulnerable, prompting the U.S. to develop mobile systems, the Soviet Union sought to curb the M-X and any similar (new weapons) programs. When the U.S. showed concern over the Soviet BACKFIRE bomber, the USSR attempted to avoid constraints on that system and again raised the FBS issue. As a selling point for SALT 2, the Soviets argued that progress made at this step of the arms control process was merely a building block for even greater progress, which would be achieved in future agreements.

The FBS issue has plagued SALT from the very start. How "strategic weapons" are defined determines what SALT may constrain. However, how "national security" is perceived and to what extent weapons outside of SALT jurisdiction impinge on that security affects what issues the sides will choose to negotiate at SALT. The time has probably come, with the completion of SALT 2, either for redefinition of the jurisdiction of SALT or for reorganization of arms control efforts into more meaningful fora. SALT and MBFR (the talks for mutual reduction of forces and weapons in Central Europe) have become bogged down and are becoming increasingly unable to produce meaningful agreements. Soviet concern over FBS and complementary Western concern over Soviet medium and intermediate-range weapons must be accounted for in some future arms control forum. During SALT 2, the Soviets have raised the FBS issue enough times and in such a manner as virtually to require its inclusion in any SALT 3 talks.

Intimately tied to future FBS negotiations would be such weapons systems as Soviet BACKFIRE bombers and American cruise missiles. Soviet assurances regarding constraints on BACKFIRE capabilities will be called to question when "theater" systems are considered for limitation. Equally, normal time constraints on developments of weapons systems for deployment will no longer prevent the U.S. from putting long-range missiles on land, sea, and air-based platforms as well as transferring such weapons to allies. Cruise missiles are, thus, logical victims for inclusion in theater/strategic arms limitation talks.

In general, Soviet arguments at SALT 2 to limit FBS, cruise missiles, all elements of the strategic triad, new weapons (including M-X) give impetus to wide-ranging arms control discussion in any future negotiations. At that point, there would have been little likelihood that such Soviet systems as BACKFIRE and the heavy, land-based ICBMs (SS-18s) could be kept out of the talks. In essence, the Soviets have sought constraints on improvement in technology (qualitative limitations). That is, indeed, the normal direction of evolution at SALT.

Such a trend does tend to complicate matters, however. Certainly, agreements are more difficult to reach. Even if they can be attained, though, the ability to monitor compliance is strained. Soviet insistence that any arms control agreements be verified by national technical means has been accepted (in the agreements, themselves) as adequate for SALT 1 and SALT 2. Nevertheless,

considerable doubt has been voiced in the U.S. about the extent to which NTMs are in fact able to assure compliance with all elements of qualitative constraints. Any anticipated future SALT negotiations would concern more qualitative limitations. One logical conclusion which follows from such reasoning is that, if sole reliance is placed on NTMs for future verification, then either agreements will be concluded with the foreknowledge that there is less inherent assurance of verifying them or the problems in verification will make agreements more difficult to reach, take longer and perhaps even be impossible to conclude. An alternative conclusion might be that sole reliance must not be placed on NTMs, that, indeed, more intrusive measures are necessary if any meaningful arms control measures are to be implemented.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

During the seven years of SALT 2 negotiations from 1972 to 1979, Soviet writers have argued consistently in favor of a SALT 2 agreement. Why they did so is open to interpretation. The question that naturally arises in this regard is: what have been the ultimate goals of the Soviet Union at SALT? Are the Soviet leaders genuinely interested in arms control; or do they really seek clear-cut strategic superiority; or do they merely find in SALT a means of competing on equal ground to incrementally strengthen their position relative to the U.S.? The data presented in this paper could, to some extent, be used in support of any of these contentions; it will support none unambiguously. It does, however, lead one away from acceptance of pure arms control motives on the part of the Soviets (as could U.S. actions at SALT argue against purely altruistic motives).

Based on the results of both SALT 1 and SALT 2, it seems clear that, in pursuing SALT, the Soviets were not inclined to bargain away any strategic weapons programs either operational or in development at the time. On the contrary, the Soviets protected their rights to develop, produce, and deploy newer and better strategic arms.

The themes used in Soviet arguments for SALT 2 were general in nature, and expressed notions that appear even in Western writings. They can be seen as basic Soviet interests in arms control and as a rationale for their efforts at SALT. The themes also reflect Soviet notions of peace and war in the nuclear age. At the heart of Soviet philosophy, it must be remembered, is a concept of an inevitable clash between the continually struggling communist and capitalist states, with the ultimate victory (in the Soviet view) belonging to their side. The struggle may be played out under conditions of peaceful coexistence and detente, and may use step-by-step arms control as a means, but it is being played by the Soviet Union for ultimate stakes. Therefore, while Soviet themes regarding SALT may serve such functions as expressing actual Soviet sentiments, gaining and bolstering support of elements of the American audience who might share such ideas, and voicing purely propagandistic points, they nevertheless reflect Soviet ideology. To the extent that ideology is a determinant of Soviet policy, these themes represent significant notice of Soviet intentions regarding the broader strategic relationship with the U.S.

Soviet objectives at SALT seem to have been chosen on more strictly military terms. The Soviet Union (the military, in particular) has understandably had reason to desire constraining the U.S. FBS capability, as well as curbing new U.S. weapons, such as the cruise missile and M-X. At the same time, the urge to protect and preserve Soviet capabilities is similarly understandable. Shifts in pursuit of these objectives often followed changes in the political environment, however, and were often raised or dropped, as tactical maneuvers, to block or encourage American concessions.

The answer to the central question--why have the Soviets for seven years striven so consistently to sell SALT 2?--must be speculative; it is not intuitively obvious even to the informed observer. Recent Soviet actions in Afghanistan can provide an object for such speculation.

There is increasing probability that the SALT 2 agreements will not have an opportunity, in the near term, for U.S. Senate ratification action. In the first days of 1980, the President requested and the Senate agreed to hold SALT 2 consideration in abeyance. Even without such a request, there was no clear indication that the Senate would have chosen to approve SALT 2 for ratification if it had continued debate on that issue. It is also likely that the Soviets had come to the same conclusion, at least by early December 1979, when they must have been considering acting in Afghanistan. Their subsequent military incursion into that country evidences apparently intentional disregard for anticipated Western reaction. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and potential action elsewhere in the region, is the type of military action made possible by their current strength, acquired over the long, drawn-out course of the past 20 years.

This is not to say that the Soviets planned years ago to invade neighboring states in 1979/1980. Rather, their strategic military power--previously deficient--now permits conventional power projection for political purposes. While negotiating SALT, it has been possible for the Soviet Union to balance--and over-balance--its military forces. This, it would seem, has been a constant Soviet goal in the entire SALT process.

It is interesting--perhaps puzzling is a better word--that the Soviets would choose at this time to flex their new-found muscles, especially in the light of shifting American public opinion toward a reversal of recent U.S. weakness and vulnerability. If present trends continue, American intentions will probably be translated into increased defense budgets, larger forces, and more armaments. This trend should have been predictable to Soviet decision makers.

Thus, it may well turn out that Soviet goals at SALT have been achieved in vain. The Soviet military is strong and capable of power projection as a means of politics. However, it may soon be faced with a resurgent U.S. and NATO, newly remotivated as a result of threatening Soviet trends. The consequences could prove the error of Soviet strategy at SALT. This intellectual excursion into speculation is meant, not to prove or disprove Soviet intentions in pursuing SALT 2, but rather to suggest that even a successful long-term campaign to achieve goals at SALT could have been waged in vain. If the Soviets saw SALT as a period during which American impotence or indifference, combined with active Soviet armaments programs, would achieve or lead to usable Soviet superiority, then their efforts may well have failed.

NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Willian G. Hyland, Soviet Perspectives on Security, Adelphi Paper No. 150 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1979), pages 22-3.

<sup>2</sup> Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet Military", Problems of Communism 25 (January-February 1975): 26.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas W. Wolfe, "Soviet Approach to SALT", Problems of Communism 19 (September-October): 2.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., page 3.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., pages 3-4.

<sup>6</sup> R. Garthoff, page 26.

<sup>7</sup> Douglas Garthoff, The Soviet Military and Arms Control, ACIS Working Paper No. 10 (Los Angeles, Ca.: Center for Arms Control and International Security, UCLA, November 1977), page 7.

<sup>8</sup> Edward L. Warner, III, The Military in Contemporary Soviet Politics: An Institution Analysis (New York: Praeger, 1977), page 239.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., page 238.

<sup>11</sup> D. Garthoff, page 6.

<sup>12</sup> Harriet Fast Scott and Willian F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1979), pages 151-3.

<sup>13</sup> R. Garthoff, page 27.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid., page 30.

<sup>15</sup> G.A. Trofimenko, "V Interesakh Chelovechestva", Izvestiya, 5 September 1972, page 4.

<sup>16</sup> Thomas W. Wolfe, The SALT Experience (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1979), page 93.

<sup>17</sup> At the Moscow summit in May 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev signed, in addition to SALT agreements, a Declaration on Basic Principles of Relations Between the U.S. and the USSR. In this declaration the two sides agreed to twelve points, key among them being the conduct of mutual relations based on peaceful coexistence; the prevention of situations capable of leading to the outbreak of nuclear war; and the defusing of international tensions. Inasmuch as the leaders of the opposing blocs agreed in this declaration to conduct their relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence, a goal of Soviet foreign policy seems to have been achieved.

18 Wolfe, SALT Experience, page 106. For discussion of Soviet "strategic culture", see Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations, Rand Paper No. R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, September 1977).

19 Advocates were located, at a minimum, within the Ford-Kissinger policy-making team. Critics included Paul Nitze and Senator Henry Jackson. Others, including Senators Edward M. Kennedy, Walter F. Mondale, and Charles McC. Mathias, supported the general thrust of Vladivostok, but urged more stringent limits and reductions.

20 Press Conference, Washington, D.C., 8 February 1977.

21 "Rech' Tovarishcha Brezhneva", Izvestiya, 19 January 1977, page 1.

22 Presidential News Conference, Washington, D.C., 24 March 1977.

23 Andrei A. Gromyko, "Statement at a Press Conference on the Results of the Talks Held by Leonid Brezhnev and Andrei Gromyko with U.S. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, March 31, 1977", Pamphlet (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1977).

24,25 For greater detail in the arguments for and against SALT 2, see, for example, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, "The SALT Process", The New Yorker, 19 November 1979, pages 104-8ff [an argument against SALT 2]; and John Newhouse, "The SALT Debate", The New Yorker, 17 December 1979, pages 130-2ff [an argument in favor of SALT 2].

26 B. Svetlov, "Zheneva: Peregovory Prodolzhayutsa", Sovetskaya Rossiya, 2 October 1973, page 3.

27 K. Georgiev, "Zadacha Ogranicheniya Strategicheskikh Vooruzheniy", Kazakhstanskaya Pravda, 3 September 1976, page 1.

28 Ibid.

29 M.A. Mil'shteyn and L.S. Semeyko, "Ogranicheniya Strategicheskikh Vooruzheniy: Problemy i Perspektivy", SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya (December 1973), page 3.

30 Georgiev, page 1.

31 Mil'shteyn and Semeyko, page 3.

32 G. Stakh, "Basic Principles of Negotiations on the Limitations of Strategic Offensive Arms", International Affairs [Moscow] [In English] 19 (November 1973), page 10.

33 "Zadacha Ogranicheniya Strategicheskikh Vooruzheniy: Problemy i Perspektivy", Pravda, 11 February 1978, page 1.

34 V. Ustinov, "New Weapons Threaten Peace", International Affairs [Moscow] [In English] (October 1979), page 33.

35 Genrich Trofimenko, "Soviet View: Why SALT II Should be OK'd by Senate", U.S. News & World Report, 16 July 1979, page 38.

36,37 Note that the terms "peaceful coexistence" and "detente", while used by both the U.S. and the USSR to describe characteristics of their bilateral relationship, mean different things to the two sides. Regarding both terms, the Western frame of reference is based on the assumption that peace and stability are desirable conditions in the international system. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, regards peaceful coexistence as itself a long-term struggle, and detente as a tactic in that struggle. For a cogent analysis of Soviet views on this topic, see Graham D. Vernon "Controlled Conflict: Soviet Perceptions of Peaceful Coexistence", Orbis 23 (Summer 1979), pages 271-97.

38 Svetlov, page 3.

39 Ibid.

40 Stakh, page 10.

41 Ibid., page 11.

42 Mil'steyn and Semeyko, page 6; and A. Karenin, "On the Limitation of Strategic Weapons", International Affairs [Moscow] [In English] 20 (October 1974), page 13.

43 Karenin, page 13.

44 Ibid., page 17.

45 Trofimenko, page 4.

46 "Zadacha", page 4.

47 A. Matveyev, "SALT-2 in the Light of Experience", International Affairs [Moscow] [In English] (October 1979), page 55.

48 Svetlov, page 3.

49 Mil'steyn and Semeyko, page 3.

50 Ibid., page 4.

51 Stakh, page 14.

52 Ibid., page 10.

53 Mil'steyn and Semeyko, page 5; and Trofimenko, page 4.

54 Matveyev, page 56.

55 Ibid., page 55

56 "Zadacha", page 4.

57 V. Kharich, "Gonka Strategicheskikh Vooruzheniy v SShA: v Storone ot Realisticheskogo Podxoda", Krasnaya Zvezda, 13 July 1971, page 3.

58 L.I. Brezhnev, "Soviet Statement on Disarmament", [11 June 1971] Current History 61 (October 1971), page 240.

59 Most Soviet articles on SALT include at least one or two references to these principles. Mil'shteyn and Semeyko (1973) cite them 11 times; Karenin (1974), five times; and the Pravda, 11 February 1978, article ("Zadacha ..."). seven times.

60 S.A. Tushkevicha, N. Ia. Shushko, and Ia. S. Dzuby, editors, Marksism-Leninism o Voine i Armiy (Moscow: The Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense, 1968).

61 Ibid., page 12.

62 Pravda, 22 July 1974.

63 Wolfe, SALT Experience, pages 105-6.

64 John Hebers, "Kissinger Describes Vladivostok Accord as 'Breakthrough' ", New York Times, 25 November 1974.

65 Wolfe, SALT Experience, page 190.

66 "The SALT Deadlock", editorial, The Wall Street Journal, 19 May 1975.

67 Gromyko, "Statement", 31 March 1977.

68 "Zadacha", page 4.

69 Georgiev, page 1.

70 "Soviet 'KFIKE Statement'", signed by Soviet President Brezhnev in Vienna, 16 June 1979.

71 Congressional Research Service analyst Francis T. Miko termed this the Soviets' "first objective, in terms of emphasis", Soviet Strategic Objectives and SALT II: American Perceptions, Report No. 78-119F Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress (25 May 1978), page 53.

72 "Zadacha", page 4.

73 Triad is the U.S. designation for the three-element structure of the U.S. strategic force, composed of land-based ICBMs, submarines, and air-breathing systems (bombers and cruise missiles). Triad is also used to refer to the Soviet Union's three-pronged strategic force structure.

74 Miko, page 52.

75 Stakh, pages 11-13.

76 Article VII of the ABM Treaty and Article IV of the Interim Agreement.

77 Stakh, pages 12-3. Also see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 1973), page 59.

78 Stakh, page 13.

79 Georgiev, page 3.

80 "Zadacha", page 4.

81 Ustinov, pages 33-4.

82 Ibid., pages 34-5.

83 Georgiev, page 3.

84 Stakh, page 11.

85 "Zadacha", page 4.

86 Ibid.

87 Matveyev, pages 52-3.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ABM: Anti-ballistic missile.

ALCM: Air-launched cruise missile.

BACKFIRE: NATO designation of Soviet bomber, Tu-22M.

CM: Cruise missile.

FBS: Forward-based systems.

GLCM: Ground-launched cruise missile.

ICBM: Intercontinental ballistic missile.

IRBM: Intermediate-range ballistic missile.

LTBT: Limited Test Ban Treaty.

MBFR: Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction [Talks].

MIRV: Multiple independently-targetable reentry vehicles.

MRBM: Medium-range ballistic missile.

M-X: Missile-experimental [mobile].

NTM: National technical means [of verification].

SALT: Strategic Arms Limitation Talks;  
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty.

SLBM: Submarine-launched ballistic missile.

SLCM: Sea-launched cruise missile.

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TIME**